Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity
WebMar 17, 2010 · A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach. Jongwook Kim and Joseph T. Mahoney View all authors and ... Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity. American Economic Review, 88: 902-932. Google Scholar. Besen, S.M., & Raskind, L.J. 1991. An introduction to the law and … WebIncomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity By B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM AND MICHAEL D. WHINSTON* Why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties' obligations vague or unspecified? Traditional answers to this …
Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity
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WebMar 12, 2024 · While fixed-price contracts are commonly invoked in the literature under the assumption that parties to a relational contract use efficiency wages or repeat purchase mechanisms (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Brown et al. 2004), they are not consistent with the theory of strategic ambiguity. http://emaj.pitt.edu/ojs/emaj/article/view/23
WebTransaction costs explain why contracts are incomplete and fail to specify fully the optimal obligations in each possible future state of the world. One cause of incompleteness is the cost of litigating and enforcing contracts. Contract theorists focus ... Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design Version: April 3, 2009 ... WebNov 1, 2024 · The strategic ambiguity hypothesis posits that when some aspects of performance are observable but not verifiable, the optimal contract is deliberately …
WebAmerican Economic Review, 88 (4), 1998, 902-932. Why are observed contracts so often incomplete in the sense that they leave contracting parties' obligations vague or … WebI conclude that firms use strategic ambiguity to circumvent legal constraints. AB - The strategic ambiguity hypothesis posits that when some aspects of performance are …
WebMar 17, 2010 · A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach Show all authors. Jongwook Kim. Jongwook Kim. ... Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity. American Economic Review, 88: 902-932. Google Scholar ISI. Besen, S.M. , & Raskind, L.J. 1991.
WebFeb 3, 2012 · Luo Y., (2002) Contract, coorperation, and performance in International Joint Ventures.Strategic Management Journal, 23, pp.903-919. Mellewigt, T., A. Madhok and … rawson properties albertonWebMay 15, 2024 · In addition, there are a variety of types of ambiguity affecting the efficiency in the industry: ambiguity due to numerous variations in the bill of quantities, incomplete clauses and those that ... rawson properties bloubergWebDec 19, 2015 · Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity. American Economic Review, 88(4), 902–932. Google Scholar Bertelsen, S. et al. (2003). Avoiding and managing chaos in projects. In 11th Annual Conference in the International Group for Lean Construction (pp. 1–14). Google Scholar Biggiero, L. (2001). Sources of complexity in human systems. rawson properties benoniWebJan 1, 1997 · Incomplete contracts and strategic ambiguity (Discussion paper / Harvard Institute of Economic Research) [Bernheim, B. Douglas] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping … simple living room bookcaseWebNoldeke and Schmidt (1995), \Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics. Che and Sakovics (2004), \A Dynamic Theory of Holdup," Econometrica. Bernheim and Whinston (1998), \Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review. rawson properties centurionWebJan 1, 2024 · An incomplete contract is an agreement that does not specify actions and payments for all possible contingencies. All but the simplest contracts are incomplete, containing ‘gaps’ that must be filled by negotiation, convention, or formal dispute resolution procedures such as courts and arbitration. rawson properties brackenhurstWebJan 1, 2009 · incomplete contracts might be chosen b y agents who face strategic ambiguity. Spier (1992) has. ... Mukerji and T alon (2001) discussed incomplete contracts in the presence of the decision-theoretic. rawson properties bothasig